
Winning Buyers Assess Value Creation Before The Deal Closes
In today’s market, the advantage is not simply starting value creation sooner. It is knowing, before the deal closes, whether the value-creation story is likely to hold up in practice.
In this tumultuous and volatile deal market, directors face more risk—and more responsibility—than ever. Experts and directors share board must-dos for this moment from the first thesis to the final look-back.


Director, Douglas Elliman

Director, Hitachi

Director, Cenna Biosciences

Chairman, SFC Energy AG
When Saks Global bought Neiman Marcus for $2.7 billion in December 2024, the idea was to create a luxury retail powerhouse. Combining Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman would give the company greater scale and lower costs in a changing retail market.
Barely a year later, Saks Global was bankrupt. The deal saddled the company with billions in debt and anticipated savings were slow to materialize. Cash shortages became so severe that suppliers stopped shipping merchandise. By June 2026, the company emerged from bankruptcy under a new name, with most of its debt wiped out—and its former owners left with nothing.
The lesson: Though the merger had a strategic rationale, the economics ultimately couldn’t support it. And that’s a critical distinction boards need to make before an acquisition comes up for a vote.
As the M&A market warms up once again, we talked to a dozen directors and other experts to draw out some key questions should be asking, and asking often.
“The biggest mistake usually occurs before any M&A deal is signed,” says David Crean, chief business officer of MediciNova and managing partner of Cardiff Advisory, who has advised more than 250 companies on transactions and is chair of Paracrine and director at Cenna Biosciences. “Once a board becomes emotionally or strategically committed to an acquisition, diligence can turn into confirmation rather than investigation. The discussion subtly changes from, ‘Should we do this transaction?’ to, ‘How do we get this transaction done?’ Those are very different questions.”
The first smart discipline is simply engaging. Jonathan Foster, founder and managing partner of Current Capital Partners, director of Amcor, Lear Corporation and Five Point Holdings, and author of On Board: The Modern Playbook for Corporate Governance, has served as an expert witness in Delaware Chancery Court deal litigation. Too often, he says, directors defer to colleagues with more deal experience or to the bankers in the room. “Sometimes directors forget everybody’s got one vote and equal liability,” he says. “While you may not have a strong finance background, you just do your best to dig in and participate.”
Directors who follow a sound process and engage, he adds, “even if you make a bad decision in retrospect, you will have been thoughtful, you should feel okay about it, and you should be protected from liability in most situations. It’s when you don’t engage and don’t have a process and aren’t careful and aren’t independent that you get in trouble.”
The boards that handle M&A best have already worked through their strategic priorities with management before a deal comes along, says George Casey, global chairman of corporate and chairman of the Americas at Linklaters and vice chair of the Center for European Policy Analysis. Without that groundwork, acquisitions can become one-off propositions, with directors left trying to determine how a particular target fits, or whether it fits at all. “If the board does not have a good strategic plan, then the activist may actually push the company to do things that the board has never thought about,” Casey warns.
The surest safeguard is to lock down the strategy before any target is on the table, says Driscoll Ugarte, a corporate and securities partner at Duane Morris, where he also serves on the firm’s governing partners board. Ugarte recalls one recent public-company transaction in which the board compared management’s preferred deal with three alternatives. The proposed acquisition actually came in last; shareholders would have received more if the company had simply liquidated. It’s why Ugarte wants directors to insist on seeing alternatives to an acquisition, including a “no deal” scenario, with the same level of analysis management devotes to the proposed transaction.
“‘We can afford the acquisition’ is not the same as ‘the acquisition is the best use of capital,’” says Crean, who recommends comparing the costs and risks of building a capability, buying it, partnering with another company or simply waiting. Christopher Lingner, a principal in Baker Tilly’s business advisory practice, boils the decision down to two questions: 1) Do we need this capability? 2) Is an acquisition the best way to get it? His test: “If this particular target disappeared tomorrow, would we still say that entering this market or acquiring this capability was central to our strategy?”
Wilson White, director at Douglas Elliman who served on the Vector Group board through Douglas Elliman’s spinoff and Vector’s sale to Japan Tobacco, warns that availability “can start to masquerade as strategy.”
“One of the most revealing questions to ask is whether we would be looking for something like this business if it were not for sale,” says White, who is also vice president and global head of government affairs and public policy at Google, who also wants management to make the case against its own recommendation. What would a standalone plan look like, with the same capital and management attention devoted to it? “When the alternative on the table is the status quo, almost any well-presented deal looks attractive,” he says.
Sunaina Sinha Haldea, global head of private capital advisory at Raymond James and chairman of SFC Energy AG, believes directors need to get involved well before there’s a deal to approve—“early enough to shape the strategic rationale, but not so early that directors become dealmakers.” Acquisition criteria and valuation parameters should already be established by the time management starts pursuing targets. “By the time a transaction reaches the board for approval, there should be no strategic surprises.”
An auction can make a buyer forget why it wanted the business in the first place. “The time to decide when to walk away is before the process starts,” says Ugarte. He recommends setting a maximum bid early and requiring any offer above it to come back to the full board for fresh analysis, rather than approving it on a last-minute call. That discipline can be harder to maintain against well-funded private equity bidders with different capital structures and return expectations. “Public companies should never confuse winning an auction with creating shareholder value,” says Sinha Haldea. “The discipline to walk away is often more valuable than the courage to bid higher.”
Lingner asks management to split the valuation into three pieces: the target’s standalone value, the incremental value this buyer can create, and how much of that increment is being handed to the seller in the price. “If a buyer identifies significant value from synergies but pays the seller for substantially all of those synergies, the strategic thesis may be correct while the economics for the buyer are not,” he says.
Revenue synergies are “easy to forecast and notoriously difficult to deliver,” says Sinha Haldea. Lingner has seen that firsthand: In one acquisition, the buyer counted on cross-selling products to the target’s customers, only to discover after closing that customer overlap and demand were much thinner than anticipated. More rigorous customer research during diligence might have exposed the weakness. “Customer adjacency is not necessarily customer overlap,” he says, “and addressable synergy is not the same thing as executable synergy.”
It’s the kind of assumption Crean wants directors to challenge before agreeing on a price. What happens if commercialization runs a year late? If only half the expected synergies materialize? If revenue grows at 8 percent instead of 15? He argues that directors should identify the assumptions that could sink the investment case and establish in advance when those would become reasons to walk away. Otherwise, he says, “directors risk discovering a problem and then rationalizing why it no longer matters because everyone wants to finish the deal.”
Foster wants directors to get comfortable challenging the financial models themselves, and he insists on seeing base, downside and upside cases, and cautions against assuming that a business bought at eight times EBITDA will command that same multiple down the road. Even the discount rate used to value future cash flows deserves scrutiny: Does it reflect the return the company actually requires? “If the banker says it’s worth $100 million, that doesn’t mean it’s worth $100 million,” says Foster, who spends half his day as a banker.
Directors should also understand whose incentives are driving the deal, because management may be paid on growth or size, while advisors are paid on closing. “That does not make their advice wrong,” says Ugarte, “but the board should recognize who bears the downside.” Michael Ben, who led Honigman’s public company, securities and governance practice for 15 years, recommends reviewing with a compensation consultant whether annual incentives and performance share units could tilt management toward doing the deal. He also urges directors to ask: “Will this acquisition mask poor organic performance historically or expected in the future?”
The warning signs that momentum has overtaken judgment are remarkably consistent. One is a shifting rationale. “If the original argument was revenue growth, but diligence weakens the growth assumptions and management begins emphasizing cost synergies, strategic positioning or defensive considerations instead, directors should pay attention,” says Crean. “The thesis may be moving because the original thesis no longer works.” Sinha Haldea watches for “moving goalposts, increasingly optimistic assumptions and an unwillingness to engage with downside scenarios.”
Another is urgency generated by the process itself—rival bidders, weekend deadlines, an earnings date. “The moment a management team starts talking about winning the deal rather than creating value from the deal, the board should slow the process down or rethink it,” says Crean. A third is sunk-cost reasoning: how much work has been done, what the market might think if the company stops. “Those may be relevant considerations,” says White, “but they are not reasons to do a bad deal.” He also listens for unresolved risks being reframed as things the company can “simply manage after closing.”
Lingner’s favorite question: “What have we learned during diligence that makes us less excited about this transaction?” If the answer after weeks of diligence is, “nothing,” he says, “I would probably want to probe further.”
And sometimes the answer is, simply, “no.” Isabelle Deschamps, a Hitachi director and former chief legal officer of Rio Tinto, says having the courage to tell management a deal isn’t right on strategy, timing or valuation—and working through it collaboratively—is a sign of a mature, effective board.
Process is also the board’s best legal protection. Deals end up in court, Foster says, when there’s no clear record that the board was fully informed, independent and engaged. His rules: never approve a significant deal in one meeting, and actually read the minutes before approving them. Where conflicts exist, Casey says the most common mistake is creating a special committee without truly empowering it to hire its own advisors, run the process and make decisions—and failing to vet those advisors’ own conflicts, a frequent focus of Delaware courts.

In today’s market, the advantage is not simply starting value creation sooner. It is knowing, before the deal closes, whether the value-creation story is likely to hold up in practice.
For dealmakers, assessing value-creation opportunities begins well before the deal closes. Identifying potential sources of value is only the first step. The more important question is whether the assumptions behind the investment thesis can be assessed before signing.
That distinction matters in a competitive market. A buyer may identify growth prospects, procurement savings or operational improvements as potential sources of value. But an opportunity on paper is not the same as a realizable path to EBITDA growth. Leading buyers are using diligence not only to find risk, but also to assess their value-creation opportunities.

Before signing, boards should press for a sign-to-close blueprint that both sides agree on and a governance model with the authority to act on it.
Carve-out playbooks are plentiful, covering everything from purchase mechanics and Transition Services Agreement scope to reps and warranties and Day One readiness. Yet for all that breadth, two things are routinely overlooked: an effective, agreed-upon sign-to-close blueprint and a governance model empowered to act on it. In our experience, these missing pieces are why so many deals stall. We believe these gaps explain why so many deals stall between signing and close.

The discipline that saves companies in distress can also drive stronger performance in healthy ones.
I have spent more than 25 years inside companies at every point on the performance curve: turnarounds, growth acceleration and strategic repositioning across agriculture, supply chain, distribution and emerging technology. That vantage point produces one observation that has never stopped striking me as strange: The most disciplined companies I have ever seen were the ones closest to death.
Walk into a company in genuine distress, with lenders circling and liquidity measured in weeks, and you will find an operating discipline that healthy companies claim to want and almost never have. Priorities are ruthlessly few, because there is no slack to fund the rest. Cash is visible daily, down to the customer and the SKU. Decisions that once took quarters are made in days, by named individuals, with the information that exists rather than the information everyone wished for. Accountability is enforced, not encouraged: commitments have dates, dates have owners and misses trigger action the same week.

Boards overseeing serial acquirers should prioritize relationship-first deal sourcing, disciplined post-close integration, and long-term value creation over short-term ROI.
Having done eight acquisitions in 10 years and grown Grote Company Family of Brands from a regional manufacturer to a global network with 11 locations, I can tell you this: Building market dominance through serial acquisitions isn’t about being the most aggressive buyer or having the deepest pockets. It’s about thinking in decades rather than quarters, and building something that compounds over time.
Over the years, I’ve learned what actually works versus what just sounds good when it comes to acquisitions. Here are a few of those lessons.
“The most common blind spot is assuming that ‘diligence was done’ means the risks that matter were examined,” says Ugarte. Diligence is organized around what advisors are hired to review, and gaps appear in what’s harder to quantify. Directors should ask what wasn’t reviewed, what couldn’t be verified, and what was accepted on the target management’s word. Lingner distinguishes transaction diligence, which surfaces historical issues, from ownership diligence, which asks what it will take to run the business on day one, day 100 and three years out. A systems integration that disrupts billing and collections, for example, can quickly become an unmodeled cash-flow problem.
Technology and cyber risk can “take a back seat to valuation, financing and the mechanics of getting the deal closed,” says White. “Technology diligence belongs in the core value and risk discussion, alongside price and financing, rather than in an appendix to the deal.” Ugarte has seen both sides. For one private equity client, the disclosure of two large data breaches before closing produced a roughly $15 million price reduction. In another deal, an acquirer connected a software target’s network to its own without a security assessment and later found that pre-closing malware had spread into its systems.
Regulatory risk, meanwhile, has intensified. Deschamps warns that regulatory hurdles can change the valuation and even the scope of a transaction. She advises directors to ask whether the approving regime is strictly legal or more politically driven, which jurisdictions will move first and whether a long path to closing risks talent losses or interlopers.
White urges boards to assess both whether a deal can close and what the business will look like after remedies, operating restrictions or divestitures. With governments increasingly using industrial policy and national security to shape commercial outcomes, “whether a similar deal has been approved before is useful context, but it is only a starting point.” And a reverse breakup fee “is not a solution,” Casey adds. The board still needs confidence that the deal can clear and that its value will still be there 12 or 18 months later.
Finally, no risk should be weighed without considering others. Litigation alone rarely kills a deal, Deschamps notes, but combined with regulatory, accounting and valuation concerns, it can tip the balance. “You don’t look at these things in isolation.”
Boards “sometimes spend more time diligencing financial assets than identifying the human assets that actually produce the results,” says White. His question: Whose departure would materially reduce the value of this business? “The answer may not be the CEO. It may be someone several levels down who holds critical customer relationships, technical expertise or institutional knowledge.”
Ed Brzychcy, an Army veteran whose firm, EB Meridian, focuses on post-merger implementation, sees the cost when that question goes unasked. “In the end, we aren’t buying the assets or even the earnings,” he says. “We’re buying the organization that produced them.” Yet boards often validate the financials, he says, “then assume the people come with the assets,” only to watch the institutional knowledge walk out the door after closing.
He wants diligence to ask: Who are the five to 10 people the business can’t lose? Show me a decision made last month without the founder or CEO in the room. What breaks if the founder is unreachable for two weeks? Red flags include answers that always route back to the founder and sellers who insist nothing will change after close. Retention packages have limits, he adds. “Money can buy presence, but it doesn’t necessarily buy commitment.”
Lingner urges boards to treat culture as part of the economics—unexpected turnover carries real costs—and to challenge the assumption that the acquirer’s way is the right end state. “If management believes a company is valuable enough to acquire, directors should ask: What are they doing better than we are, and what are we prepared to preserve or learn from them?” Ugarte points to Disney’s 2006 acquisition of Pixar, in which Disney put Pixar’s creative leaders in charge of its own animation studio.
Sequencing matters, too. Casey advises against negotiating employment agreements with the target’s CEO while the deal itself is being negotiated, which creates distracting dynamics shareholders may later challenge. Ugarte recommends settling the post-closing leadership structure before closing, since ambiguity about who will lead drives attrition.
Foster, who joined the Amcor board after its combination with Berry Global, says integrating cultures starts at the top and shows up in small things, such as changing signs, stationery and email addresses quickly. The message to senior people should be candid: “You’re not all going to be happy. We’re going to listen to you. We’re going to make decisions as fast as we can. We’re going to be transparent in our communications.”
White adds one caution: “Uncertainty fills a vacuum. At the same time, management should not manufacture certainty where none exists.”
Roei Samuel, founder and CEO of the advisor network Connectd, agrees. “Boards should be cautious when management assumes that talent will remain simply because the strategic rationale makes sense on paper.” He says boards should expect management to measure how integration affects morale, retention and productivity and adjust accordingly.
Valuation and integration are “two sides of the same coin,” says Casey, who suggests putting the future integration lead on the diligence team from the start. Before approving a deal, directors should know exactly who will deliver the value.
“The model does not deliver the synergies. People do,” says Crean. He wants a named executive responsible for each material synergy, with a timetable and measurable outcomes. “If nobody can tell the board who is personally accountable for delivering a synergy, that synergy should not receive full value in the acquisition model.”
Before closing, Ugarte recommends requiring a written integration plan with an accountable executive and a 100-day plan, a scorecard translating deal goals into a few measurable outcomes and agreement on what success and failure look like at 12 and 24 months. In one deal, a quarterly scorecard revealed within two quarters that key-customer retention was below plan, prompting a course correction. In another, management reported plenty of integration activity but never tracked the value metrics—and the board didn’t revisit the thesis until a large impairment surfaced two years later.
For large combinations, Foster favors a dedicated integration office led by a senior executive and an integration report at every board meeting for the first 18 months or so. Brzychcy argues for monthly reporting in the first 90 to 100 days, when human factors degrade fastest, tracking leading indicators such as whether key people are still engaged and whether decisions are being made at the right level and speed. Deschamps has seen small board committees work well for overseeing integration, given how much happens in that phase.
The line is clear: “Management owns the integration plan; the board owns accountability for the investment thesis,” says Lingner. Tracking an integration task list, adds Brzychcy, “is absolutely crossing into micromanagement.”
If Crean could change one thing about how public boards oversee acquisitions, every major deal would begin and end with the same one-page investment thesis: why the company is buying, what alternatives it considered, what assumptions justify the price, who is responsible for the value and what milestones define success. That document should return to the board six, 12 and 24 months after closing. “Do not rewrite history,” he says. “Do not substitute a new strategic rationale.”
That accountability changes behavior up front. Foster once sat on a board whose company consistently missed its projected returns on capital investments. He told the CEO he would not approve projects promising more than 25 percent, but that he didn’t want to see teams miss. Projections—and results—improved dramatically. Lingner warns against the quiet erosion of the original case: If the board loses sight of what it approved, “it becomes too easy to continually rebase expectations until an underperforming acquisition appears to be performing adequately.”
“Time can solve an execution problem,” notes Crean. “Time rarely solves a broken investment thesis.” When a deal underperforms, he asks directors to consider: Would we acquire this business today at its current implied value? Would we invest another $50 million? “The board’s responsibility is not to defend the original decision indefinitely,” he says. “Its responsibility is to make the best decision with the information available today.”
Few boards do these reviews consistently, says Ugarte, “yet comparing results with the approved proposal is how a board learns from an acquisition and improves future decisions.” The point, adds Sinha Haldea, “is not to assign blame but to improve capital allocation discipline. A self-reflective board is an effective one.”
Ugarte offers three questions every director should ask at the outset of a deal: What would cause us to walk away? What are we assuming that we cannot verify? And how will we know, 12 months from now, whether we were right? White distills it to one: “Compared with the best realistic alternative available to us, what has to be true for this transaction to create superior long-term value, and which of those things are we assuming rather than knowing?”
Boards that can answer those questions honestly, he says—before signing and long after closing—will be the ones whose deals actually deliver.